American soldiers dug foxholes into the ridgeline at Djebel Chambi. They had only arrived in North Africa a few weeks ago and faced light resistance from Vichy French troops. The infamous Afrika Korps under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel had just launched a massive offensive the day prior. The Americans knew what was coming.
They were eager to fight the Germans and felt they were ready to do so.
Upon hearing movement in the darkness on February 20, 1943, the Americans on the hill shot flares into the sky that illuminated the hilltop. They were stunned by waves of Italian infantry with their distinctive plumed helmets charging up the slope, firing SMGs and rifles while lobbing hand grenades that detonate on impact. The 5th Bersaglieri Regiment overran the Americans, killing dozens and driving the rest off the hill.
The Italian commander, Colonel Luigi Bonfatti, lay dead on the ground. His regiment had cracked open the American defenses at Kasserine Pass. Rommel's tanks began pouring into the pass, moving toward the American supply depots and staging areas near Thala and Tebessa.
The Battle of Kasserine Pass was America's first major fight against the European Axis in World War II. It turned into one of the most humiliating defeats of the war. But that defeat sparked changes that reshaped the U.S. Army and led to victory in North Africa three months later.
The Race for Tunis
By early 1943, the war in North Africa had turned against the Axis. Allied forces had landed in Morocco and Algeria in November 1942 as part of Operation Torch while brushing aside Vichy French defenders. Meanwhile, British General Bernard Montgomery chased Rommel across Libya after the defeat at El Alamein.
Tunisia became the last Axis stronghold in North Africa. The country's mountainous terrain created natural defensive lines. Two parallel mountain chains, the Eastern Dorsal and Western Dorsal, ran north to south across central Tunisia. Between them lay a broad plain. Whoever controlled the mountain passes controlled movement through the country.
Rommel retreated to the Mareth Line in southern Tunisia, a series of French-built fortifications designed to stop an Italian invasion from Libya. His Afrika Korps would defend there against Montgomery approaching from the east. But American and British forces pressing from the west threatened to trap him. Rommel decided to strike the inexperienced Americans before the Allied pincers closed.
The Allied command structure was a mess. British Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson led the First Army in northern Tunisia. French General Louis-Marie Koeltz commanded XIX Corps in the center with two poorly equipped divisions that the other commanders did not trust. American Major General Lloyd Fredendall commanded II Corps in the south. Fredendall reported to Anderson, but the two rarely communicated.
They issued conflicting orders. Nobody seemed certain who was in charge or what their strategy was.
First Blood at Faid Pass
On January 30, 1943, the German 21st Panzer Division struck French positions at Faid Pass. The French fought hard but were pushed back. They requested reinforcements and support. Fredendall and Anderson let the request go unfulfilled. The Germans took Faid Pass and positioned forces on the Eastern Dorsal.
Meanwhile, Fredendall made several poor decisions that set the Axis up for success. He set up his headquarters 70 miles behind the front in a place called "Speedy Valley." He had engineers blast tunnels into a cliff face for a bombproof command post. Troops called it "Lloyd's very last resort."
Fredendall never visited the front lines. He issued orders over the radio in coded slang nobody could understand.
Major General Orlando Ward commanded the 1st Armored Division. Anderson ordered Ward to split his division into separate task forces scattered across the front. Ward objected loudly. Splitting armor violated basic Army doctrine. Combat Command A ended up fragmented across a 30-mile front from Sbeitla to Kasserine to Haidra.
The infantry units did not fare much better. They were established on different terrain, too far to support each other and without adequate anti-tank weaponry. Artillery was placed too far away to provide adequate fire support and friendly air superiority had not been established.
Meanwhile, the Axis began massing their armor and mechanized forces for an offensive that would exploit their recent victory at Faid Pass as well as American inexperience.
War correspondent Ernie Pyle watched the American soldiers prepare for battle and saw their quality despite poor leadership.
"There is nothing wrong with the common American soldier," he wrote. "The deeper he gets into a fight, the more of a fighting man he becomes."
Disaster at Sidi Bou Zid
On February 14, General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim launched a massive offensive. His 5th Panzer Army struck through Faid and Maizila Passes with 140 tanks from the 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions. A sandstorm covered their advance. General Dwight Eisenhower had inspected American positions at those passes just three hours earlier.
American forces held two hills west of Faid, Djebel Lessouda and Djebel Ksaira. These positions were supposed to anchor the defense. Instead, they became death traps. The hills sat too far apart to provide mutual support.
Lieutenant Colonel John Waters, General George Patton's son-in-law, commanded the battalion on Djebel Lessouda. He had already warned his men after their easy fight against the French that the next fight would not be so easy.
"We did very well against the scrub team. Next week we hit the Germans."
German tanks surrounded Lessouda by 10:00 AM. Waters lost radio contact. His planned artillery support failed to help them.
Only about 450 men from Waters' battalion escaped. Waters himself was captured on February 15. He would spend the next two years as a POW.
On Djebel Ksaira, Colonel Thomas Drake's force of 1,500 was also trapped. The 168th Infantry Regiment was effectively destroyed soon after.
Fredendall ordered a counterattack on February 15. Fifty-one American tanks from the 1st Armored Division rolled toward Lessouda in parade-ground formation. After engaging the Axis armor, it appeared that the enemy was retreating. The Americans chased them.
A line of concealed German 88mm anti-tank guns, dual-purpose weapons originally designed for aircraft, ambushed the American tanks with devastating accuracy. These guns could penetrate American armor at ranges where U.S. guns couldn't even reach.
Only seven tanks survived the slaughter before withdrawing.
One American soldier who witnessed the slaughter said "It was murder. They rolled right into the muzzles of the concealed eighty-eights and all I could do was stand by and watch tank after tank blown to bits or burst into flames."
Dominic Martello served with the 39th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division. His unit had been sent forward on February 14 with orders to hold no matter what. German tanks encircled them. They ran out of ammunition, food, and water. On February 18, Martello was captured. He became one of the first American prisoners taken by the Germans in North Africa.
By February 16, II Corps had lost 1,600 men, nearly 100 tanks, 57 half-tracks, and 29 artillery pieces. Anderson ordered a withdrawal to the Western Dorsal, the final defensive line protecting Algeria. The passes at Kasserine and Sbiba became the new American positions.
But the Axis were far from finished.
Rommel Pushes Forward
Rommel wanted to exploit the victory. He proposed driving west through Kasserine Pass to Tébessa, a major Allied supply base just inside Algeria. Capturing Tébessa would cut Allied supply lines and threaten the entire front.
His Italian superiors had other ideas. Comando Supremo in Rome ordered him to split his forces. Attack northwest through both Kasserine and Sbiba toward Thala and Le Kef. Clear the Western Dorsal. Threaten the British First Army's flank.
Rommel was furious. The plan dispersed his strength. It exposed his flanks. A concentrated drive on Tébessa made more tactical sense. But he followed orders and launched the attack on February 19.
The 21st Panzer Division struck north through Sbiba Pass. They ran into heavy resistance. British, American, and French forces had laid extensive minefields. British artillery hammered the approaching panzers. The 34th Infantry Division held positions on the heights. The 18th Regimental Combat Team from the 1st Infantry Division reinforced them.
By February 20, the German attack at Sbiba had stalled completely. The Allies held firm.
As he usually did, Rommel decided to ignore his orders. The failure at Sbiba convinced him to concentrate everything on Kasserine Pass.
The Pass Falls
Colonel Alexander Stark commanded the mixed force defending Kasserine, elements of the 26th Infantry, 19th Combat Engineers, 6th Field Artillery, a tank destroyer battalion, and a French artillery battery. They were spread across a two-mile gap in the mountains. Stark had too few men and too little time to prepare.
German reconnaissance units probed the pass on February 19. They found American positions surprisingly strong in the center. Rommel ordered the main assault for February 20. He brought up the 10th Panzer Division, Afrika Korps units, and the Italian Centauro Armored Division.
The morning was cold and rainy. Mud covered the rocks. Fog limited visibility. Rommel arrived personally. He saw wrecked American trucks along the road "with dead men sitting at the wheels, evidently shot up by low-level air strikes."
The Axis attack started slowly. Heavy vehicles bogged down. Fog grounded the Stuka dive-bombers. American artillery fire forced German infantry to take cover. Rommel committed more forces, panzer regiments, Nebelwerfer rocket launchers nicknamed "Screaming Meemies," and the 5th Bersaglieri Regiment.
The Italians infiltrated the American positions during the night. They launched their frontal assault on Djebel Chambi in the early morning hours. German Panzer grenadiers attacked simultaneously in the center. By 1:00 PM, the combined assault broke through, allowing Rommel's armor to advance through the pass.
One American ranger later noted the Bersaglieri that overran his position were some of "Italy's toughest troops." He wished that he would never face them again.
The 19th Combat Engineer Regiment was left undefended and took the brunt of the attack. Colonel Anderson Moore's men fought until overwhelmed. Tanks and Bersaglieri from the Centauro Division rolled down Highway 13 brushing the Americans aside. Of 1,200 men in the battalion on February 18, only 125 remained by February 19.
British reinforcements tried to hold. Brigadier Charles Dunphie sent Gore Force, 11 tanks, infantry, artillery, and anti-tank guns, into the northern exit. They fought a delaying action, but all 11 tanks were destroyed.
American units retreated in chaos. Some fell back in good order. Others broke. Some infantry threw down their weapons and stripped their gear off before fleeing. Equipment littered the roads, tanks, half-tracks, guns, trucks. Forward artillery observers abandoned their posts. Some vehicles were completely abandoned in working condition.
Axis forces then split into two columns. Rommel personally led the 10th Panzer Division north toward Thala. A combined German-Italian force including the Centauro Division drove west toward Tébessa.
The Americans Hold the Line
The road to Algeria lay open. But the Americans were ready.
Combat Command B under Brigadier General Paul Robinett linked up with the 16th Infantry Regiment from Major General Terry Allen's 1st Infantry Division at Djebel el Hamra. They were done running.
Robinett positioned his forces on key terrain within range of each other to provide support. Tanks went hull-down behind ridges. Infantry dug in on the slopes. Anti-tank guns covered all approaches. Forward artillery observers found concealed positions with clear views of the battlefield. They registered fire on every likely avenue of advance.
The Afrika Korps assault group came up the Hatab River valley on February 21. American and British artillery opened up. Shells rained down on the German-Italian column. The 5th Bersaglieri, Centauro tanks, and elements of the 15th Panzer Division tried to push through.
The Americans held firm. The attack failed.
North at Thala, British and American reinforcements arrived throughout February 21 and 22. The 26th Armored Brigade took blocking positions. Most importantly, the 9th Infantry Division's artillery arrived after a four-day, 735-mile forced march from Algeria. When the 10th Panzer Division attacked on February 22, massed Allied artillery destroyed most of the tanks. Communications broke down. The advance stalled.
Rommel realized his offensive had failed. He was overextended and fuel was running low. Montgomery's Eighth Army was approaching the Mareth Line, held only by a screen of Italian infantry divisions. Allied air power was growing. On February 22, he ordered a final withdrawal.
A massive American air strike occurred on February 23. The bombers hit German positions around the pass. By February 25, Axis forces had pulled back to their starting positions. American troops reoccupied Kasserine Pass, capturing several hundred Italian prisoners.
The Aftermath
Allied casualties totaled 10,000, including 6,500 Americans (300 killed, 3,000 wounded, 3,000 captured), plus hundreds of British and French losses. The U.S. also lost 183 tanks, 104 half-tracks, 208 guns, and 512 trucks. Axis casualties were only 2,000, with about 20 tanks destroyed. However, the Germans captured 45 tons of ammunition and 50,000 gallons of fuel.
The Army required over 7,000 replacements to bring the mauled units back to full strength. German commanders began dismissing the Americans as a hollow force instead of a formidable enemy. Even the British allegedly began referring to the American Army as "our Italians."
Unlike most of his superiors, Rommel came away with respect for his opponents. In his journal, he wrote, "The tactical conduct of the enemy's defense had been first class. They had recovered very quickly after the first shock and had soon succeeded in damming up our advance by grouping their reserves to defend the passes and other suitable points."
He was also impressed by American equipment. "British experience has been put to good use in American equipment," he noted. American trucks were superior to anything the Germans had. The M3 half-track, despite thin armor, impressed German commanders with its reliability.
Many of the vehicles the Americans lost in the battle were repaired and refitted by Rommel's troops. American forces occasionally destroyed or recovered some of their equipment from enemy forces through the rest of the campaign.
Sweeping Changes
Eisenhower moved to recover from the disaster. On February 20, he sent Major General Ernest Harmon to assess the situation. Harmon found Fredendall exhausted and defeated. When Harmon arrived at 3:00 AM, Fredendall handed him a note authorizing him to take charge. Then Fredendall went to bed.
Harmon reported back that Fredendall was "no damn good." On March 6, Eisenhower relieved him and installed George S. Patton as the new commander of II Corps.
The contrast between the generals was stunning. Patton imposed discipline immediately. He led from the front. His expectations were clear. One officer recalled Patton addressing them before a battle. Patton allegedly said he expected to see casualties among staff officers that would convince him a serious effort had been made to take the objective.
Eisenhower restructured the command. He created the 18th Army Group under British General Harold Alexander. This unified British, French, and American forces under single operational control. Liaison officers from each nation were spread out among the different units and command staff. The confusion that crippled units at Kasserine disappeared.
The Army also implemented sweeping changes. Air superiority became mandatory for ground operations. Units trained as combined arms teams. Artillery learned to mass fires on select targets. Tank destroyers stopped chasing panzers and used defensive tactics such as hull-down positions. Infantry and armor practiced coordinated attacks. Infantry also learned to better prepare defensive positions and how to counter enemy tanks.
Meanwhile, equipment improved. New M10 tank destroyers with 75mm guns were issued to the forces. One Army officer noted that the Germans were about to be quite surprised by the new tank destroyer.
Most importantly, the Army learned to trust its soldiers. At Djebel el Hamra, the 1st Infantry Division managed to blunt the Axis. At Thala, American units stopped Rommel's final assault. While the battle was lost, it was a failure on leadership, not the common soldier.
Only a few weeks after taking command, Patton's troops went toe-to-toe with the Afrika Korps at El Guettar and held their own. Meanwhile, Allied forces overran Axis defenses in the north and south, pushing the Axis into a small pocket.
By May 1943, Allied forces had trapped them against the Mediterranean coast. On May 13, the last Axis troops in North Africa surrendered. Nearly 250,000 German and Italian troops went into captivity.
Dominic Martello survived his 2.5 years as a POW. He credited his sense of humor with keeping him alive. The experience left deep scars however. He suffered flashbacks for the rest of his life. Decades later, reflecting on what he'd been through, he said, "Sometimes I wonder if it really happened."
Kasserine Pass exposed every weakness in the American Army, poor intelligence, inadequate training, scattered units, confused command, leaders who couldn't adapt. But it also proved that American soldiers could learn under fire. British commanders at the time noted that it was exactly the experience the U.S. Army needed before conducting massive offensives against the Germans going forward.
The American Army that came out of Tunisia never lost another major battle in the European Theater for the rest of the war.
