The Constitution, Federal Power, and the Military: Why One Scholar Says the Balance Has Shifted

In a moment when nearly half of Americans identify as politically independent, constitutional scholar William J. Watkins Jr. of the Independent Institute argues the country has drifted far from its founding structure. In his new book, The Independent Guide to the Constitution, Watkins makes the case that the Constitution was designed to limit federal authority and reduce political conflict, not intensify it.

Watkins frames the current moment as a turning point. He sees both major political camps moving away from constitutional limits—one toward expansive federal authority, the other toward a flexible, evolving Constitution. In his view, neither reflects the original design. Instead, he argues for a return to a system in which federal power is narrowly defined, and states retain primary authority over most policy decisions.

What “Limited Federal Power” Was Supposed to Mean

At the core of Watkins’ argument is a simple but often overlooked principle: the federal government was never meant to have general authority over domestic life. Instead, it was designed as an “agent” of the people, exercising only the specific powers listed in the Constitution.

That framework is laid out most clearly in Article I, Section 8, which enumerates Congress’s powers. Watkins emphasizes that this structure flipped the traditional model of government. Historically, governments held broad authority, and citizens had limited rights. The Constitution reversed that: the people retained sovereignty, and the federal government received only defined, limited powers.

Over time, however, that distinction has blurred.

How Federal Power Expanded and Why It Matters

Watkins points to several turning points where federal authority grew significantly, including the aftermath of the Civil War and the Progressive Era. During this period, the United States shifted from a decentralized federation toward a more centralized system.

One major driver of that expansion has been the interpretation of the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court has upheld broad federal authority under this clause, including in cases like Wickard v. Filburn, which allowed Congress to regulate even local economic activity if it believed it affected interstate commerce.

Watkins argues that this interpretation has effectively created a national “police power,” something the Constitution never explicitly granted. He points to federal criminal statutes, such as firearms possession laws tied to interstate commerce, as examples of how far this expansion has gone. 

Watkins says that this shift toward national, one-size-fits-all policymaking undermines the original design of the Constitution. The Founders expected that states would reflect the distinct values, cultures, and priorities of their own populations, allowing different approaches to issues like criminal law, social policy, and economic regulation. 

In that system, citizens would focus more on state and local government—where most decisions affecting daily life were meant to occur—rather than looking to Washington for uniform answers. By contrast, Watkins contends that concentrating power at the federal level has turned nearly every issue into a national conflict, raising the stakes of political disagreement and deepening division

Watkins also points to a subtle but telling linguistic shift. Before the Civil War, Americans commonly referred to the country as “the United States are,” reflecting a collection of sovereign states joined together. Over time, that phrasing gave way to “the United States is,” signaling a conceptual move toward a single, unified national authority rather than a federation of independent political communities. In his view, that change in language mirrors a deeper transformation in how Americans understand where power resides and how much of it belongs in Washington.

The Military as a Case Study in Federal Authority

Service members operate almost entirely within federal systems. Their chain of command, legal obligations, and deployment orders all originate from federal authority. Watkins argues that this level of centralized control would have surprised the Founders, who were deeply skeptical of standing armies.

That skepticism appears in early American political thought and is reflected in constitutional design. Congress, not the president, was intended to control war-making authority, as outlined in Article I, Section 8. 

In practice, however, modern military operations often proceed without formal declarations of war. A detailed explanation of how war powers have evolved is available through the Congressional Research Service. 

Watkins sees this as part of a broader shift away from congressional control and toward executive-led military action.

National Guard, Federal Control, and Changing Roles

The National Guard offers a clear example of how federal and state authority have merged over time. Originally rooted in state militias, the Guard now operates under a dual-enlistment system, allowing federal activation of entire units.

This system was developed in part after the Spanish-American War exposed limits on deploying state militias overseas, prompting Congress to pass the Militia Act of 1903, which restructured the National Guard as a reserve component of the U.S. Army. Today, Guard members can be mobilized for federal missions abroad or domestic emergencies at home. 

Watkins argues that this evolution reflects a broader trend toward centralization, moving away from the state-controlled militia system the Founders envisioned.

Military Justice and Constitutional Limits

The military justice system provides another lens into federal authority. Governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), it operates separately from civilian courts.

The UCMJ, enacted in 1950, is administered under authority granted to Congress in the Constitution. 

Watkins generally views this system as consistent with constitutional design, though he notes potential concerns when servicemembers commit civilian crimes off base. In such cases, he suggests civilian courts may be more appropriate.

At the same time, he acknowledges that military service requires a different legal framework. Discipline, uniformity, and readiness demand stricter rules than those applied in civilian life.

Federal Spending, Entitlements, and the Debt

Watkins extends his argument beyond military structure to fiscal policy. He contends that broad interpretations of federal spending power have contributed to the national debt.

The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Butler expanded Congress’s ability to spend for the “general welfare,” even without a direct link to enumerated powers. Although the Supreme Court struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act in this case, the Court also embraced a broad reading of Congress’s spending power, saying it was ‘separate and distinct’ from the other enumerated powers and limited mainly by the requirement that it serve the general welfare.

Watkins argues that this expanded spending model would have been unrecognizable to the Founders, who expected federal authority and federal budgets to remain limited.

Why This Debate Matters Now

For Watkins, the stakes are not just academic. He believes the expansion of federal power has intensified political conflict by turning every issue into a national battle.

Instead of allowing states to pursue different policies, the current system forces a single outcome on the entire country. That dynamic, he argues, fuels division and raises the stakes of every election.

For service members, the stakes are more than theoretical. Every enlisted troop and commissioned officer swears an oath to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States,” not a political party or a set of policies. Watkins’ argument ultimately points back to that obligation: understanding the Constitution’s limits and structure is not just an academic exercise, but part of what it means to serve.

Watkins’ central claim is straightforward: the Constitution provides a roadmap back to a more stable system with clearer limits, less centralization, and fewer national flashpoints.

Whether that roadmap is still politically viable remains an open question.